## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

5 November 1975

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SUBJECT

"CIA Representative's Comments on "Cruise Missiles: Programs, Requirements and Alternatives," Interagency Paper dated 16 October 1975


1. All of the options being considered for dealing with cruise missiles in SALT TWO will present difficult monitoring problems. As indicated below, we would probably have difficulty in determining deployment levels, ranges, and missions of cruise missiles. Given these difficulties, the CIA representative believes that decisions on cruise missile limits should be made primarily on the basis of other factors.

## Monitoring Deployment

- 2. From the monitoring standpoint alone, the best limitation would be a total ban on deployment. Monitoring would be difficult, but still easier to monitor than a provision limiting the number of missiles or their launch platforms. Water and Bridge
- 3. Monitoring problems could be compounded if the Soviets were to develop small, long-range cruise missiles which, like the proposed US SLCH, could be launched from torpedo tubes. Deployment by the Soviets of cruise missile launchers capable of containing either tactical or strategic missiles would create additional difficulties.

Monitoring Range Capability

However, if the Soviets employed





concealment measures in cruise missile development, our estimates of maximum range could have considerable uncertainty, even greater than by a factor of two or three. For the purpose of monitoring range limitations, therefore, a ban at a fairly short range level would be preferable. In that case, while we would still have difficulty in determining maximum cruise missile ranges, we would be more confident that the Soviets were not developing cruise missiles with very long ranges.

## Monitoring the Mission

5. Cruise missile definitions which are not dependent on determining the nature of payload are preferable. It could be extremely difficult to detect the exchange of reconnaissance equipment for a warhead on a remotely-piloted vehicle or drone.

Consequently, a definition which specifies that only nuclear-armed cruise missiles are to be limited would impose another difficult monitoring task.

## Soviet Intentions

6. We have no evidence of Soviet intentions to develop long-range cruise missiles. The Soviets have the technical capability to upgrade some of their present cruise missiles to systems of longer range at any time. They could develop more compact and accurate long-range cruise missiles in the mid-1980s. With a high-priority program the Soviets could probably field advanced, long-range cruise missiles before the 1985 expiration date for the new agreement. They might undertake either of these options if they perceived that the US was gaining an appreciable strategic advantage from its cruise missile programs. Such a response would not be automatic, however, and the Soviets might instead seek to counter the US programs by further improvements in air defense or by upgrading other strategic offensive forces.

